Considering the phenomenon of epistemic echo chambers the paper analyses the features of closed knowledge communities, both their disadvantages and cognitive and social functions. Particular attention is paid to the attempts to treat their obvious flaws (such as isolation, dismissal of counter-arguments, prejudice) as advantages that, in certain cases, provide protection and access to information for marginalized communities. This change of focus implies a rejection of idealized normative understanding of epistemology. Instead, some of the provisions of the so-called “non-ideal epistemology” are used. It is suggested that non-ideal epistemology is the most radical and “honest” form of social epistemology, since it not only postulates a certain dependence of epistemic subjects on various social contexts, but also allows for a substantial revision of epistemic obligations depending on the social status and position.

The article considers the concept of «rhizome» of G. Deleuze and F. Guattari. The author outlines the «tree-like structure» problem, the reaction to which «rhizome» became, carries out the analysis of «tree» and «rhizome». The author traces the origins of «rhizome», sequentially analyzes and comments on the principles of «rhizome». Then «rhizome» is transferred from the ontological field to the literary field and illustrated with the example of the novel «Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas» by Hunter S. Thompson. Special attention is paid to the prospects of the notion of subject in the context of rhizomaticity.

This article offers a critical rethinking of the view on ideas of psychoanalysis that have been established in Russian philosophical texts. The need to consider psychoanalytic concepts in the history of philosophy of the twentieth century, as well as in other educational courses, led to the creation of an unsubstantiated theoretical construct – «the philosophy of psychoanalysis». Against the backdrop of a number of problems of this type of conceptualization, we propose to concretize the area of interaction between philosophy and psychoanalysis to a series of anthropological questions that have consequences for cultural, ethical and socio-philosophical issues, but in a revised form that does not have a direct connection with the theory and practice of contemporary psychoanalysis. Such a clarification, as shown in the article, allows us to more adequately and correctly (without the inaccuracies of a superficial and philosophically biased translation) present the originality of psychoanalytic ideas. This approach confronts us with the question of how exactly contemporary psychoanalytic thought can be used as a methodology in philosophical and anthropological research.

In recent years, Fabian Wendt’s sufficientarian or moderate libertarianism has stood out among theories of distributive justice. This theory is based on the project pursuit argument and recognizes individual’s rights to self-ownership and ownership of external resources. But the second of these rights is limited by the sufficiency proviso, which requires that all people have a minimum sufficient share of resources to engage in personal projects. This article takes a critical look at moderate libertarianism, showing that its limitation to the sufficiency threshold is incompatible with its reliance on the project pursuit argument, since this argument implicitly assumes a presumption of equal concern for persons. In the absence of additional reasons, this presumption requires that people as projects pursuers be given not a sufficient, but an equal share of external resources.

The article presents a review and substantive analysis of socio-humanitarian studies devoted to virtual communication. The range of topical problems related to the spread of virtual communication is defined: the lack of a generally accepted understanding of the essence of virtual communication and, as a consequence, the lack of a single definition; the presence of a variety of inconsistent methodological approaches to its study; the growing number of highly specialized studies of virtual communication in psychology, sociology, pedagogy and others. An interdisciplinary criterion of differentiation of existing approaches to the analysis of virtual communication is proposed, the essence of which is to determine and identify the priority direction of the influence of virtual communication: on society or on the individual. We analyze the work on each of the directions, characterize the subjects of influence of virtual communication, and trace the results of this influence.

Coherentism is the only proper account of justification of empirical knowledge. The final representation of Lawrence Bonjour’s coherentist conception of justification includes such theses as: (a) Justification is a function of coherence and depends on the fact that the system of beliefs is not only coherent at the moment, but remains coherent over a sufficiently long period of time, facing continuous input to its content due to the influence of reality. It is this stability that gives reason to believe that the coherence of the system most likely leads to the truth of beliefs; (b) The system contains a large number of different kinds of cognitively spontaneous beliefs that play the role of those with which all other beliefs of the system must cohere, as well as a sufficient number of law-like statements ascribing to these kinds (including those kinds of introspective and memory beliefs that are necessary in order to recognize other cognitively spontaneous beliefs) a high degree of reliability within the system regarding accompanying assumptions, causal explanations of their genesis, previous experiences in assessment situations, etc; (c) A necessary condition for justification is that the person must be able to cognitively grasp, explicitly or implicitly, at least the approximate content of the belief system and its coherence. This Presumption justifies the only thing that connects our belief system and reality – cognitively spontaneous beliefs. The most controversial element of the conception (d), meta-justification (the demonstration that the standards of coherentist justification are truth-conducting) is a priori in nature and does not require additional justification, since it itself is a consequence of the chosen metaphysical constraints, primarily of internalism. The review is a detailed analysis of the second part of L. Bonjour’s book «The Structure of Empirical Knowledge» (chapters 7–8), dedicated to foundations for a coherentistic theory of justification of empirical knowledge.