We argue that genuine moral philosophy is realist, and genuine realism is a contextual realism. Thus, we introduce the position of a contextual moral realism. This is our interpretation of J. Benoist’s moral realism in terms of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The structure of the contextual realism is the structure of the gap between the ideal (rule, norm, concept) and the real. It is also the structure of Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem. Accordingly, the structure of the contextual moral realism is the structure of the application of a moral norm to reality. Norms, including moral norms, are defined and applied in context. The application of a moral norm implies moral sensitivity to a context that is not external to the norm. The contextual moral realism is a critique of moral objectivism, which ignores moral ontology, as well as metaphysical moral realism (Platonism) and naturalistic moral reductionism, which ignore the contextual (genuinely normative) dimension of morality. We also establish similarities between T. Williamson’s moral realism and Benoist’s moral realism, despite the difference in their approaches: for Benoist, philosophy is conceptual analysis, while Williamson sees no principal difference between science and philosophy.  In particular, Williamson’s argument against moral inferentialism corresponds to Benoist’s argument against M. Gabriel’s “new moral realism”, and his argument in favour of moral knowledge by sensory perception and by testimony corresponds to contextual argument appealing to moral sensibility.  

The paper aims to look at the possibilities of overcoming the restriction on the systematic overdetermination of mental causation in the ordinal naturalism of J. Buchler. We think that in ordinal naturalism, conscious behavioral acts have integrity and specificity, while being associated with other orders (physiological, psychological, social), but not being reduced to them, which ensures the complexity of mental causation, i.e. the possession of both mental and physical traits of both cause-events and effect-events. This will allow us to change the form of causal statements so as to avoid overdetermination. Mental causation is interpreted as an irreducibly natural complex. The order of physical events excludes mental traits as irrelevant. In the order of events of conscious behavior, a coalescence of physical and mental complexes occurs, forming a new integral complex. Therefore, highlighting the mental aspect of causation is a description of the traits of both the cause-event and the effect-event, belonging to the same order of conscious behavior. The identification of individual traits may have the syntactic character of the analysis of causal statements, but ontologically both types of causality are real relations of natural complexes of different orders.

The paper considers the freedom of choice, which is a conceptual problem for contemporary philosophical anthropology. It is argued that absoluteness, which is not a “given” (like the gift of life), is “clarified” in the reflection of the decision made, this formalizes human identity. This “sublimation” does not take place by nature, but by the decision of the individual; absoluteness is a certain existential state. It is proved that the “modes of self-affirmation” are conditioned and fragile, absoluteness comes from freedom, transcendent in its foundation. It is stated that the deformation of the ontological and cognitive structures of experience (“personalized” knowledge) changes the meaning of the values of the “alienated” individual, who is not free in society; the Kantian antinomy (of freedom and necessity) receives an interpretation of the “existential drama” in “non-classical” philosophy. It is concluded that individuality is the result of a person’s free choice.

The article attempts to reconstruct the analytical debates on the morality of torture. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 served as a pretext for renewing the discussion. Professor of law Alan Dershowitz initiated debates on the justification of torture in extraordinary circumstances. Dershowitz’s argument consists of several key propositions: a) we must acknowledge the widespread use of torture; b) we should bring torture into the realm of law. Dershowitz’s idea has met both support and criticism from various professional humanitarians. Despite the tremendous amount of criticism, Dershowitz’s argumentation in many aspects still remains one of the few ways to engage in a substantive debate in favor of the use of torture.

The paper focuses on the linguistic aspect of demonology in «Leviathan» by Thomas Hobbes. Firstly, demonology is considered as a danger to political stability in «Leviathan». Secondly, the main points of the philosophy of language and the place of metaphor in Hobbes’ political philosophy are presented. Thirdly, through Hobbes’ understanding of metaphor, ways of neutralizing demonological prejudice in «Leviathan» and the sovereign’s monopoly right to use metaphors are discussed.

The article examines the ontological status of reasons for action. There are two positions: the reasons for actions (desires and beliefs) are construed either as states or dispositions, or as events. Anticausalists believe that reasons for actions are states and therefore they cannot be causes of actions, since causation is possible only between events. D. Davidson argues against this view, showing, on the one hand, that our mental states can be causal conditions, and, on the other hand, that under certain conditions they become events (he calls this an “onslaught” of states) and acquire causal power. Davidson’s solution assumes that mental states are dispositional properties, and as a consequence it inherits the weakness of this philosophical concept. The article proves that such a solution cannot be satisfactory due to the difference between physical and mental states.

The typology of natural sciences is based on the separation of fundamental and applied components. The first form the necessary basis (foundation) of the second. The development of applied research is possible only on the basis of fundamental research. The last 150 years have seen an accelerated development of applied science, which has not diminished the importance of its fundamental component for the overall development of natural science. A different situation has developed in social science. The use of social sciences to serve the interests of the ruling classes since the times of classical capitalism has led to the obstruction of theoretical social science and, at the same time, to a decrease in the level of development of both its applied field and the social sciences in general. The main attention of social scientists began to focus on the study of the technological side of social activity, which relates to natural science.

Laurence Bonjour believes that foundationalism is a dead end. Literally all possible reasons for basic beliefs have been analyzed – externalism, the doctrine of the given, and a priori justification. Externalism, where the basic factors of justification are tied up to the causal or nomological in nature relations between the subject and the world, cannot overcome skepticism and is the way for accepting belief as basic only for those who are aware of these relations. Direct apprehension of the given can provide epistemic support only if the knowledge itself is constructed in such a way that this support is necessary. The appeal to the fact that basic beliefs, justified a priori, can stop the regress of empirical justification does not pick out the difference between justification and warrant. The conclusion is not comforting: there is no way in which basic empirical beliefs could be justified without their justification being dependent on other empirical beliefs that themselves require justification. The argument against the existence of basic empirical beliefs and the accompanying reception of the problems of justification of empirical knowledge in a line with classical epistemology (internalism, realism, correspondence theory of truth) are still the best examples of a corresponding philosophical reflection over the past forty years. The review is a detailed analysis of the first part of L. Bonjour’s book «The Structure of Empirical Knowledge» (chapters 1–4), dedicated to the criticism of foundationalism.