The paper gives an overview of the main stages of the development of «The Siberian Journal of Philosophy». It is shown how the journal is permanently linked with the history of the Philosophy Faculty of Novosibirsk State University. The role of Academician Yu. L. Ershov in the development of professional philosophical education at NSU is revealed and explained. The Summer Philosophical Schools held by the Faculty and the Siberian Philosophical Seminar’s are noted as a main factors that formed the philosophical community around the NSU. Today, the journal acts as an organizer of interaction within the professional community and represents the face of the university in the media space of Russian philosophy. The author believes that for twenty years the journal has earned authority and has become a notable phenomenon in the life of the philosophical community not only in Siberia, but throughout the country.

A critique of phenomenological interpretation of quantum Bayesianism (QBism) is offered, in particular, the position of M. Bitbol and L. de La Tremblay, which removes remnants of scientific realism from QBism and adopts a radically phenomenological first person point of view. It is shown that phenomenological view of quantum mechanics cannot explain cognition of quantum reality and behavior of real quantum systems, because the ultimate reality for phenomenology is autonomous phenomena, which, in fact, do not exist. Our proposed contextual quantum realism (CQR) does not invert, as the mentioned authors do, but rejects, the traditional relation between experience and reality. By reinterpreting QBism, our CQR removes remnants of phenomenology from it, but in such a way as not to fall into the other extreme – metaphysical realism.

The article provides a brief analysis of the current debate on the two types of knowledge – knowledge-how and knowledge-that and discusses the possibility of reduction of the former to the latter. Two promising anti-reductionist strategies are highlighted. The first strategy uses the notion of “epistemic luck” to demonstrate that the epistemic characteristics of these two kinds of knowledge differ. The second strategy can be based on M. Dewitt’s treatment of linguistic knowledge, which, if accepted, at least deprives the proponents of epistemic reductionism of claims to the universality of their position.

The article presents specific recommendations for the examination of AI systems in medicine developed by the authors. The recommendations based on the problems, risks and limitations of the use of AI identified in scientific and philosophical publications of 2019-2022. It is proposed to carry out ethical expertise of projects of medical AI, by analogy with the review of projects of experimental activities in biomedicine; to conduct an ethical review of AI systems at the stage of preparation for their development followed by monitoring the testing of the created system; to focus on bioethical principles during the examination of AI systems for medical purposes.

The concept of interpassivity plays an important role in understanding the interaction of contemporary human and media; this explains the growth of its usage in the last two decades. However, popularization leads to a transformation in the understanding of this concept or its confusion with others. In our opinion, it is important to preserve the original meaning of this issue. An analysis of the main elements of the concept by R. Pfaller and S. Zizek demonstrates the heuristic value of such “conservatism”, which limits the shift in thematic emphasis. The influence of other concepts (authenticity and alienation) leads to a simplification of the interpassivity, since in this case this concept no longer draws our attention to those aspects that are poorly distinguishable in the optics of humanistic discourse and social criticism. On the contrary, the preservation of the original interpretation makes it possible to include issues of pleasure, unconscious fantasies and beliefs in the consideration of a number of problems of human relations with contemporary media.

The article is devoted to the revision of the validity of opposing the concepts of social integration as a consensus and social disintegration as a conflict. The methodological basis is the rethinking of the back-ground assumptions of influential socio-philosophical theories proposed by T. J. Bernard. It is shown that along with the understanding of social integration as order and consolidation, and disintegration as conflict and deviation, there are also other interpretations in the structure of socio-philosophical thought. In some of these interpretations, social integration characterizes ideal, not real, societies and is not related to social practice, while in others, social integration immanently includes a disintegration process.

The paper brings the analysis of the peculiar features of Bacon’s utopianism, it’s linkage to and tensions with classical utopias, technocratic ideas, Christian humanism and Hobbesian ethics. The research is trying to revisit conventional views on the so-called Bacon’s technocratic perspective for the future of science, state and society. We argue that ethical framework of Bacon’s theory of science and it’s societal institutions has much in common with the Kenotic ethics of Christian humanism. His utopian novel follows this ethical pattern as well. The “limitation of science by religion” described in “New Atlantis” and in early tracts was on the other side a step in later Hobbesian direction towards the development of secular civic moral. In spite of this Baconian ethics was altruist & collectivist, unlike Hobbesian moral of selfishness & individualism.

The paper aims to unfold the «internal» content of Gettier’s argument as a skeptical argument against knowledge in terms of answering the question: «why he could be right when he says what he says». Our initial hypothesis is that E. Gettier does not say anything about the «accidentality of the fact that Smith has 10 coins in his pocket», but he uses the words «entailment» and «deduction», which substantiates the «truth of the conclusion», and on the basis of which he attributes «knowledge» to Smith. The article comes out at a certain time, E. Gettier uses the rhetoric of necessary and sufficient conditions, with regard to justification an analogue of the closure principle is given, there are exactly two examples – all this lead to the assumption that E. Gettier’s «justification» in the form he speaks about it in the staging part of the article – is a logical relationship between beliefs that are interconnected by the relationship of entailment and are fixed in the same way in the person’s belief system. Much of the evidence on pages two and three is an illustration of why this «logical interpretation» of reasoning doesn’t work. Contrary to most popular points of view, E. Gettier managed to show only that the implementation of formal relations between beliefs does not allow one to get to «knowledge» in the form in which he defines it. In particular, such a reading makes it possible to block various attempts to propose a «fourth condition». It must meet the task set – to restore confidence that the fulfillment of the formal relations between beliefs can help to get to «knowledge». However, within the framework of the linguistic turn paradigm, in which E. Gettier works, this is impossible, because in general, it simply lacks adequate means of discussing the persuasiveness of the inference. In this sense, «knowledge» is, by definition, a fuzzy concept that brings us back to «classical notions» in which the persuasiveness of an argument implies not only validity, but also soundness, relevance, and usefulness.

The paper analyzes the problem of interpretations of the Gettier problem. The author draws a distinction between counterexamples presented in Edmund Gettier’s article and Gettier-style cases, between the Gettier problem and general epistemological problem supposedly occurring in all or many Gettier-style cases. It is argued that in Gettier’s article there is a gap associated with an insufficiently defined concept of justification, which does not allow talking about Gettier problem without any explicit or implicit interpretation of his views on justification. Along with this, it is indicated that the same concept of justification has strict features (deductive closure principle, non-factive justification and internalism), which do not allow arbitrary interpretations of the Gettier problem, and therefore we can say that some interpretations are closer to the text of a well-known article.