This work continues a series of publications on the task approach in artificial intelligence. As noted earlier, the agent-based approach described in the monograph by Stuart Russell and Pieter Norwig “Artificial Intelligence. The Modern Approach", may be more argumentatively presented within the framework of the task approach. This paper will show that not only the problems of the bases of mathematics and artificial intelligence, but also many cognitive functions performed by humans and analyzed in cognitive sciences, can also be described and studied within the framework of the task approach. In particular, this paper shows that the analogue of the concept of task in cognitive sciences is the concept of goal and that the Functional Systems Theory (FST), which describes purposeful behavior, can be presented as the brain's solution of tasks to achieve goals and satisfaction of needs. It gives the chance to compare directly the tasks of artificial intellect with natural cognitive processes and, thereby, to reveal the list of those tasks of "natural" intellect and schemes of their solution which can be successfully used for the solution of artificial intelligence tasks.

The article presents a review of the phenomenon of understanding the meaning of the natural language and, more broadly, the meaning of the situation in which the cognitive agent is located, considering the context. A specific definition of understanding is given, which is at the intersection of neurophysiology, information theory and cybernetics. The schemeof an abstract architecture of the cognitive agent (of arbitrary nature) is offered, which states that an agent with such architecture can understand in the sense described in the paper. It also provides a critique of J. Searle’s mental experiment “The Chinese Room”from the point of view of the construction of artificial cognitive agents within a hybrid paradigm of artificial intelligence. The novelty of the presented work is based on the application of the author’s methodological approach to the construction of artificial cognitive agents. It not only considers the perception of external stimuli from the environment, but also the philosophical problem of “understanding”by the artificial cognitive agent of its sensory inputs. The relevance of the work follows from the renewed interest of the scientific community in the theme of Strong Artificial Intelligence (or AGI). The author's contribution consists in comprehensive treatment from different points of view of the theme of understanding perceived by artificial cognitive agents. It involves the formation of prerequisites for the development of new models and the theory of understanding within the framework of artificial intelligence, which in the future will help to build a holistic theory of the nature ofhuman mind. The article will be interesting for specialists working in the field of artificial intellectual systems and cognitive agents construction, as well as for scientists from other scientific fields - first of all, philosophy, neurophysiology and psychology.

The paper is devoted to the study of the divergence of the intensionalist and extensionalist traditions in the foundations of mathematics. One of the important manifestations of this discrepancy was the debate on the status of the Axiom of Choice. In particular, we argue that Russell's challenging Axioms of the Choice is connected with his intensionalist philosophy of mathematics and the extensionalist approach of Zermelo. It is shown that the opposition of the intensionalist and extensionalist approaches includes such key problems of the philosophy of mathematics as the epistemological features of theorems and axi-oms, the nature of logical-philosophical analysis, and the role of logic in mathematics.

The paper aims to make a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem within the framework of D. Dennett’s real patterns conception in order to show that D. Dennett’s ontology can be interpreted in a realistic sense not only within the framework of J. Ladyman’s structural realism. As a starting point, the solution of the truth-making problem within the concept of “serious essentialism” by E.J.Lowe is considered. Our thesis is that the expansion of the D. Dennett’s conception with E.J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism” leads us to the conclusion that D. Dennett’s ontology not only receives a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem, but also provides an op-portunity to answer properly to the definition of scientific realism given by M. Devitt.

The article analyzes the problems related to the philosophical analysis of epistemic duties - ranging from doubts about their existence as duties of a special kind to discussing the boundaries of such obligations and the limits of responsibility of the epistemic subject. Special attention is paid to the consideration of epistemic behavior that goes beyond the "call of duty”, supererogatory actions. The paper describes the main characteristics and examples of such behavior and makes a conclusion about the need to block or substantially clarify the imperatives of epistemic rationality, which require actions, although commendable from the point of view of standard epistemic normativity but lying beyond the scope of what is epistemically due.

In this paper, I examine intellectual integrity as one of the possible intellectual virtues. I also try to investigate the opposite notion, intellectual dishonesty. I conclude that intellectual dishonesty does not necessarily entail dishonesty in the moral sense, but just presupposes that an agent has her interest in a certain outcome of her research and that it influences her actions. The analyzed problem then looks as follows: on the one hand, we have every reason to believe that intellectual integrity is desirable for a researcher; on the other hand, this requirement is not strictly necessary. Why? I show that although intellectual dishonesty negatively affects an agent’s personal ability to comprehend the truth, it can contribute to the achievement of the truth at the social level. We get such an outcome as a result of the confrontation of such motivated agents.

The paper aims to represent the author’s methodological position that risk is a consequence of the decisions made by the person and is always associated with the person who not only makes a choice, but also evaluates the probabilities of possible events and associated losses. Taking a risk, the person chooses an alternative that is the result of her decision, although the possible results are not exactly known to her. The key to managing risk is the issue of measuring it. The law of large numbers by J. Bernoulli and related methodological and philosophical issues are considered. The significance of the St. Petersburg paradox for the modern understanding of risk is shown. Our thesis is that decision-making under the conditions of risk is not a person’s collision with circumstances independent of her, but a conscious and rational choice.

Marxism and the theory of post-industrial society are two competing but largely similar approaches to the interpretation of social development. The emergence of the hypothesis of the transition to a new, post-industrial stage of history was a challenge for Marxist theorists. They responded with a series of arguments, more or less valid, attempting to refute the main tenets of the competing theory. By now, the dispute is not over. However, it became clear that the key points of both approaches needed further justification.

The paper offers a philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of legal consciousness. We study one of the modes of legal consciousness - normative legal textuality, since it is a means of transcribing the phenomenon of legal consciousness. Outside of the classical concepts of jurisprudence and philosophy, the following categories were reflected upon: legal consciousness, text, normative legal act, discourse, and author. The subjects in the process of creating a normative legal text are: narrator, author (developer), and addressee. The distinctive feature of the authors of draft legal acts is that their legal status is quite limited compared to the legal status of the authors of any other results of intellectual activity. The addressees of draft normative legalacts are state bodies, while the addressees of texts of normative legal acts are subjects of law. For their addressees, the addressers of the texts of legal acts always remain incognito persons.

The article is devoted to the analysis of ethnic scientific communities. Based on the analysis of research literature, the author comes to the conclusion that there is a local, ethnic nature of the specificity of scientific communities. This specificity is manifested primarily in the formation of a kind of “image of science and scientist”, which is especially pronounced in modernizing societies. The obtained theoretical results are illustrated by the example of the formation, evolution and current state of the scientific and educational communities of the republics of Siberia (Tuva, Khakassia, Buryatia, Altai). It is proved that the specifics of their post-Soviet development is largely due to Soviet experience, in particular when it comes to the place of a scientist in a traditional and modernized society, the role of science and education as a social elevator, the place of spheres of intellectual production in the modern social and economic structure of these regions.

The study of the dynamics of the socio-cultural development of rural local communities under the conditions of multipolarity, multidirectional and asynchronous changes in their socio-economic space, from the point of view of the systemic approach, makes it possible to present the complex processes of rural social and cultural development. Based on the typology of functions that determine the basic strategies for the socio-cultural development of rural communities, a simulation model is proposed for analyzing the dynamics of the socio-cultural development of the village. The model has a sufficiently high degree of adequacy, verification and contributes to the formation of scientifically based conclusions. A simulation-based agent model enables the transition to the simulation of socio-cultural phenomena and processes, and the construction of their forecast scenarios.

The paper offers an analysisof the legal status of the family in theoretical models (conceptions, strategies) of ethnic, cultural, and family policy at the federal and regional levels. The results of the analysis are compared with the socio-philosophical and sociological justification of the role of the family in the formation of attitudes of young people towards interethnic interaction. It is concluded that despite the fact that the social institution of the family is not theoretically designated as a subject in the models of national policy, nevertheless it plays an important role in it. The paper justifies the proposal to fix the family as a subject of the state national policy in the models.

The paper aims to examine the compatibility problem between externalism about mental content and self-knowledge. First, I explore the main anti-compatibilist arguments and objections to them and conclude that anti-compatibilist views imply the shift from the ontological issue to the epistemic one. Second, I argue that compatibilists, in its turn, regardthis shift as unjustified. The reason for that is that they do not accept the Cartesian introspective model of self-knowledge.

The author considers the manifestations of R. Descartes' uncompromisingly negative reaction to the criticism of his conception of the human mind as a disembodied substance by the Church figure P. Bourdain. Descartes' rejection of the interpretation of the mind as a product of the functioning of the human material brain correlates with his underestimation of the reflexive component of human mental activity. Special attention is drawn to the fact that Descartes actually avoided a substantive debate with Bourdain on these issues, limiting himself to repeating those components of his position, the reasoned criticism of which he received from the opponent. It is recognized that in the end Descartes descended to the actually offensive characterization of Bourdain's critical assessment of Descartes' original position of radical doubt in the reality of the existence of anything, stating that he perceives this assessment as "barking". It is significant that Descartes had nothing with which to respond to Bourdain's criticism of his philosophical position in a reasoned way, and it is also shown that the philosopher considered it permissible for himself to report his opponent to his ecclesiastical superiors.

The paper elaborates on and develops the concept of “position”. Drawing on the examples from the history of science and philosophy from G. Galileo to the works of the Moscow Methodological Circle in the second half of the 60s - early 70s of the 19th century the author considers the cultural phenomenon of positional thinking. Special attention is paid to the philosophy of I.G. Fichte. An assumption is made and substantiated that Fichte’s dialectics is a model of specifically positional thinking and provides a basis for determining the objective content of the concept of “position”. The paper also describes the context of the emergence of positional schemes, their specific structure and use in the works of MMK as a normative-logical apparatus, an alternative to formal logic. It also outlines the area of topical problems associated with the concept of “position”.

The textbook by G. D. Boush and V. I. Razumov “The methodology of scientific research (in candidate and doctoral dissertations)” fills in the lack of fundamental and systematized works on the methodology of scientific research. The authors consistently and deeply expound the logic and procedure of preparing scientific research, reveal the heuristic potential of significant methodological approaches, technologies and scientific methods. Particular attention is paid to thecategorical-system methodology, which allows to analyze the object at the essential level and achieve holistic, consistent knowledge. The textbook should be recommended to anyone who is interested in developing their own cognitive potential, logic and methodology of thinking, understood as a tool for reengineering intellectual activity.

The article provides an analysis of the special features of the formation of Tajik enlightenment. The author also analyzes the concept of enlightenment as a social, political and cultural phenomenon in society. She indicates the periods of formation and development of Tajik enlightenment. It is noted that the emergence of Tajik enlightenment has internal and external causes. The author of the article relies on the available research to prove that Tajik enlightenment as a cultural phenomenon at a certain stage in the historical development of the Tajik people became the movement of jadidism.

Duncan Pritchard’s hinge-disjunctivist approach is not purely therapeutic, it represents a significant step forward. But, within it, the nature of the hinge propositions themselves is not fully disclosed. We interpret the hinge propositions as reality-rooted Wittgenstein rules.This allows us to strengthen the joint interpretation of the sceptical paradox. Finally, we express our doubts about the need for a disjunctivist component to solve/dissolve the sceptical problem. A sceptical scenario is meaningless, because any understanding involves the use of concepts, which, in turn, make sense only if they are rooted in reality. Our point of view is consistent with Jocelyn Benoist’s contextual realism, as well as with Robert Brandom’s position, according to which rationalists and materialistic reductionists share a common false semantic premise about the possibility of a clear separation and independent treatment of semantics and epistemology.