General Relativity and Causality, Reasoning from Metaphysics, and E. J. Lowe’s Ontology

The paper aims to show the importance of reasoning “from metaphysics” in the course of a consistent interpretation of the “against neoscholasticism” thesis (J. Ladyman). The idea that “the subject of metaphysics is metaphysical possibilities, and science determines which of them are actually achieved” (E. J. Lowe, J. Katz, etc.) reinforces the role of reasoning “from metaphysics” within the field of metaphysics of science. The general theory of relativity violates the common prevailing intuition that “causality is the subject of local physical interaction” (J. Bigelow). Interpretation of causality in terms of “forces” and “coming into” within the framework of E. J. Lowe's ontology makes it possible to talk about causality in terms of “finding” and “going out” of existence of the corresponding modes of objects connected by a formal “causal relationship”. The transition to E. J. Lowe's ontology helps not only to overcome the intuition of the locality of causality, but also reveals in its own way, for example, such seemingly simple common intuitions as the dependence of the truth of propositions on time or the understanding of time as a dimension. All this once again brings us back to the understanding of the importance of the fact that a scientist, constructing or interpreting a scientific theory, as a rule, uses non-trivial philosophical assumptions that should be the subject of its own philosophical analysis.

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