Regress Problem and the Critique of Empirical Foundationalism. Book Review: BonJour L. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. (Part I).

Laurence Bonjour believes that foundationalism is a dead end. Literally all possible reasons for basic beliefs have been analyzed – externalism, the doctrine of the given, and a priori justification. Externalism, where the basic factors of justification are tied up to the causal or nomological in nature relations between the subject and the world, cannot overcome skepticism and is the way for accepting belief as basic only for those who are aware of these relations. Direct apprehension of the given can provide epistemic support only if the knowledge itself is constructed in such a way that this support is necessary. The appeal to the fact that basic beliefs, justified a priori, can stop the regress of empirical justification does not pick out the difference between justification and warrant. The conclusion is not comforting: there is no way in which basic empirical beliefs could be justified without their justification being dependent on other empirical beliefs that themselves require justification. The argument against the existence of basic empirical beliefs and the accompanying reception of the problems of justification of empirical knowledge in a line with classical epistemology (internalism, realism, correspondence theory of truth) are still the best examples of a corresponding philosophical reflection over the past forty years. The review is a detailed analysis of the first part of L. Bonjour’s book «The Structure of Empirical Knowledge» (chapters 1–4), dedicated to the criticism of foundationalism.

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