Reasons for Action as Events and States
https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2023-21-4-87-95
Abstract
The article examines the ontological status of reasons for action. There are two positions: the reasons for actions (desires and beliefs) are construed either as states or dispositions, or as events. Anticausalists believe that reasons for actions are states and therefore they cannot be causes of actions, since causation is possible only between events. D. Davidson argues against this view, showing, on the one hand, that our mental states can be causal conditions, and, on the other hand, that under certain conditions they become events (he calls this an “onslaught” of states) and acquire causal power. Davidson’s solution assumes that mental states are dispositional properties, and as a consequence it inherits the weakness of this philosophical concept. The article proves that such a solution cannot be satisfactory due to the difference between physical and mental states.
About the Author
A. A. Sanzhenakov
Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Alexander A. Sanzhenakov, Candidate of Sciences (Philosophy). Senior Researcher
Novosibirsk
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Review
For citations:
Sanzhenakov A.A. Reasons for Action as Events and States. Siberian Journal of Philosophy. 2023;21(4):87-95. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2023-21-4-87-95
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