Epistemic paternalism and akrasia
https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2022-20-3-5-13
Abstract
Epistemic paternalism is usually understood as interference in the inquiry of another person without their consent, but for their own good. The epistemic good is often treated in the tradition of “veritism” which means the pursuit of truth. The article argues that one of the options for justifying epistemic paternalism can be epistemic akrasia, that manifests itself either in the acceptance of opposing views, or the inability to draw conclusions from already accepted premises, or the refusal to adhere to higher-order epistemic attitudes. Correcting such behavior requires an expansive interpretation of epistemic paternalism while respecting safeguards that protect such personal values as freedom and autonomy.
About the Author
A. A. ShevchenkoRussian Federation
Alexander A. Shevchenko, Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy), Leading Researcher
Novosibirsk
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Review
For citations:
Shevchenko A.A. Epistemic paternalism and akrasia. Siberian Journal of Philosophy. 2022;20(3):5-13. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2022-20-3-5-13