D. Dennett and Scientific Realism: Empirical Equivalence and Evidential Support of Theoretical Statements

The paper aims to interpret the reasoning of L Laudan and J. Leplin on the inconsistency of the theses of empirical equivalence and underdetermination of the theory by data within D. Ross’s rainforest realism and D. Dennett’s real patterns concepts. Following L. Laudan and J. Leplin, the main problem is with the absolutization of the idea that the only significant form of evidential support of a theory is the empirical confirmation of its consequences (consequentialism). We believe that the conception “to save the phenomena” (P. Duhem), as a possible alternative strategy of evidential support, could be connected with the narrative type of explanation. The definition of “perspective” that defines a pattern in terms of the “information channel” concept ensures that the explanation within D. Ross’s conception is not a deductive argument, it is precisely a “story telling” that makes it possible to single out what is significant in the intended explanation. At the same time, the non-consequentialist nature of the evidential support of the pattern (that is defined with respect to the relations between data) is justified by the fact that the pattern is real only if it contains information about another pattern, reproduces only the structural characteristics of reality, and represents the probable causes of the phenomena explained via the idea of “natural classification” within “to save the phenomena” conception.

empirical equivalence, underdetermination of theory by evidence, narrative explanation, real patterns, perspective, P. Duhem, J. Leplin, L. Laudan, D. Ross