Criticism of Reason in Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the concept of reason in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. By analyzing the concepts and terminology, the author shows the specific of reason and transcendentality in phenomenology. The specific of phenomenological transcendentality is in the possibility to prescribe to it individual features in contrast to Kantian transcendentality, which is abstract, ideal and universal. This specific of transcendentality leads to the concept of reason as a “net”, which covers the whole area of mind, including thinking, feeling, willing. Therefore, phenomenological reason is divided into logical, practical and axiological. The paper presents two kinds of that specification of reason in phenomenology - parallelism (Parallelismus) and interweaving (Verflechtung). The author assumes that Husserl uses the former model to demonstrate the system relationships of the selected areas of the reason, while the latter model is responsible for describing the functioning of this system.