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TROPIC REALISM AND KNOWLEDGE AS AN EPISTEMIC PROPERTY OF FALSE BELIEFS

https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2018-16-4-335-340

Abstract

The critical scientific realism by I. Niiniluoto is one of the few concepts that speaks not only of scientific realism, but also of reality itself. Such an elements of the concept, like tropic realism - the minimal ontological realism (in the Putnam’s sense), stating that there is no single true description of reality, or the idea that the knowledge can be a subject of the analysis of false beliefs (by definition, truthlike beliefs do not have to be true) - are the best ways to illustrate how I. Niiniluoto understands the contemporary trend to imply vagueness into definitions of the main philosophical categories like “ontological object”, “truth value”, etc. Reflections on the book: Niiniluoto I. Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press, 1999.

About the Author

N. V. Golovko
Institute of Philosophy and Law SB RAS
Russian Federation


References

1. Devitt M. Realism and Truth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997.

2. Niiniluoto I. Truthlikeness. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1987.

3. Niiniluoto I. Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford Univ. Press, 1999.

4. Niiniluoto I., Tuomela R. Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973.

5. Psillos S. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. New York: Routledge, 1999.

6. Putnam H. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.


Review

For citations:


Golovko N.V. TROPIC REALISM AND KNOWLEDGE AS AN EPISTEMIC PROPERTY OF FALSE BELIEFS. Siberian Journal of Philosophy. 2018;16(4):335-340. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2018-16-4-335-340

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ISSN 2541-7517 (Print)