D. DENNETT AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM: PESSIMISTIC META-INDUCTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM ERROR
https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2018-16-3-49-60
Abstract
The paper aims to show that the interpretation of D. Dennett’s concept of real patterns as a fundamental concept of existence makes it possible to offer a new conception of the development of scientific knowledge containing: (a) L. Laudan’s conclusion that the real history of science contradicts the idea of convergence of scientific theories, and (b) the problem of pessimistic meta-induction will not be decisive in refuting scientific realism for a given historical period of time. Within the framework of the accepted ontology, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction is presented as one of the variants of the skeptical argument - argument from error, and the notion of «projectivity in respect to a given physically possible perspective» (D. Ross) fully reveals the notion of «additional information» that a «new» theory should have over the «old one», in order to refute the skeptic's reasoning.
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Review
For citations:
Golovko N.V. D. DENNETT AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM: PESSIMISTIC META-INDUCTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM ERROR. Siberian Journal of Philosophy. 2018;16(3):49-59. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2018-16-3-49-60
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