Explanation as meta-justification.
https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2024-22-3-83-108
Abstract
The paper aims to show that some elements of J. Woodward’s manipulative concept of causality are capable of playing the role of «salient characteristics of an explanation» that can be associated with the key characteristics of meta-justification that «a system of empirical beliefs that is justified according to accepted standards is thus likely to correspond to reality» in a situation where an appeal to more traditional concepts of explanation – unificationist (P. Kitcher) or causal (W. Salmon) – is not accepted due to the «paradigm conflict» dividing the given scientific community. As a heuristics we consider the reception of C. Renfrew’s concept of the diffusion of Indo-European language across Europe during the Neolithic Revolution, proposed by A. Wiley aimed to show that «the discussion of the inconsistency of the explanation of phenomena within the Renfrew’s concept is revealed precisely along the line dividing the intuitions of Kitcher and Salmon». The key component of meta-justification will be the notion of «invariance» or «stability» of the proposed explanation «in the face of new data» (L. Bonjour). An explanation will be invariant «in accordance with Woodward’s concept» when its functionally significant components (as parts of the proposed explanatory mechanism) are connected by the relation of «constitutive explanation» (С. Craver), characterized and distinguished from the relation of causality by the requirement of «mutual manipulability»
About the Author
N. V. Golovko
Novosibirsk State University; Institute of Philosophy and Law, SB RAS
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Nikita V. Golovko, Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy) Head of the Chair of Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology of Science; Leading Researcher
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Review
For citations:
Golovko N.V. Explanation as meta-justification. Siberian Journal of Philosophy. 2024;22(3):83-108. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2024-22-3-83-108
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