Meta-justification, and necessity to reflect objective reality. Book Review: BonJour L. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. (Chapters 7–8)

Coherentism is the only proper account of justification of empirical knowledge. The final representation of Lawrence Bonjour’s coherentist conception of justification includes such theses as: (a) Justification is a function of coherence and depends on the fact that the system of beliefs is not only coherent at the moment, but remains coherent over a sufficiently long period of time, facing continuous input to its content due to the influence of reality. It is this stability that gives reason to believe that the coherence of the system most likely leads to the truth of beliefs; (b) The system contains a large number of different kinds of cognitively spontaneous beliefs that play the role of those with which all other beliefs of the system must cohere, as well as a sufficient number of law-like statements ascribing to these kinds (including those kinds of introspective and memory beliefs that are necessary in order to recognize other cognitively spontaneous beliefs) a high degree of reliability within the system regarding accompanying assumptions, causal explanations of their genesis, previous experiences in assessment situations, etc; (c) A necessary condition for justification is that the person must be able to cognitively grasp, explicitly or implicitly, at least the approximate content of the belief system and its coherence. This Presumption justifies the only thing that connects our belief system and reality – cognitively spontaneous beliefs. The most controversial element of the conception (d), meta-justification (the demonstration that the standards of coherentist justification are truth-conducting) is a priori in nature and does not require additional justification, since it itself is a consequence of the chosen metaphysical constraints, primarily of internalism. The review is a detailed analysis of the second part of L. Bonjour’s book «The Structure of Empirical Knowledge» (chapters 7–8), dedicated to foundations for a coherentistic theory of justification of empirical knowledge.

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