What is not mentioned in the famous article by Edmund Gettier
https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2023-21-1-105-126
Abstract
The paper aims to unfold the «internal» content of Gettier’s argument as a skeptical argument against knowledge in terms of answering the question: «why he could be right when he says what he says». Our initial hypothesis is that E. Gettier does not say anything about the «accidentality of the fact that Smith has 10 coins in his pocket», but he uses the words «entailment» and «deduction», which substantiates the «truth of the conclusion», and on the basis of which he attributes «knowledge» to Smith. The article comes out at a certain time, E. Gettier uses the rhetoric of necessary and sufficient conditions, with regard to justification an analogue of the closure principle is given, there are exactly two examples – all this lead to the assumption that E. Gettier’s «justification» in the form he speaks about it in the staging part of the article – is a logical relationship between beliefs that are interconnected by the relationship of entailment and are fixed in the same way in the person’s belief system. Much of the evidence on pages two and three is an illustration of why this «logical interpretation» of reasoning doesn’t work. Contrary to most popular points of view, E. Gettier managed to show only that the implementation of formal relations between beliefs does not allow one to get to «knowledge» in the form in which he defines it. In particular, such a reading makes it possible to block various attempts to propose a «fourth condition». It must meet the task set – to restore confidence that the fulfillment of the formal relations between beliefs can help to get to «knowledge». However, within the framework of the linguistic turn paradigm, in which E. Gettier works, this is impossible, because in general, it simply lacks adequate means of discussing the persuasiveness of the inference. In this sense, «knowledge» is, by definition, a fuzzy concept that brings us back to «classical notions» in which the persuasiveness of an argument implies not only validity, but also soundness, relevance, and usefulness.
Keywords
About the Author
N. V. GolovkoRussian Federation
Nikita Golovko, Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy), Head of the Chair of Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology of Science, Novosibirsk State University; Leading Researcher, Institute of Philosophy and Law SB RAS
Novosibirsk
References
1. Benacerraf P. What Mathematical Truth Could Not Be. In: M. Schirn (ed.) The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 33–75.
2. Butakov P. A. Plato, Evidentialism, and JTB. Schole, 2018, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 669-685. (in Russian)
3. Chisholm R. Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall, 1989.
4. Clark M. Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier’s Paper. Analysis, 1963, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 46–48.
5. Dancy J., Sosa E., Steup M. (Eds.) A Companion to Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
6. Dummett M. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press, 1991.
7. Gettier E. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, 1963, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 121–123.
8. Gettier E. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? In: A. Gryaznov (ed.) Analytical Philosophy: Rise and Development. Moscow: Dom Intellektual’noi Knigi, 1998, pp. 231–233. (in Russian)
9. Gettier E. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analytica, 2007, no. 1, pp. 123–126. (in Russian)
10. Hetherington S. Knowledge and the Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
11. Ladyman J., Ross D., Spurrett D., Collier J. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press, 2007.
12. Nikiforov A. L. Analysis of the Concept of Knowledge: Approaches and Problems. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, 2009, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 61–73. (in Russian)
13. Russell B. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 1951.
14. Sainsbury M. Logical Forms. An Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell, 2001.
15. Shope R. The Analysis of Knowing. Princeton University Press, 1983.
16. Steup M. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Prentice Hall, 1996.
17. Tselishchev V. V. Philosophy of Mathematics. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 2002. (in Russian)
18. Vervoort L., Shevchenko A. A. Epistemic Relativism and The Gettier Problem: Insights From Philosophy of Science. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, 2022, vol. 59, no 1, pp. 58-80 (in Russian)
19. Wittgenstein L. On Certainty. Blackwell, 1969.
Review
For citations:
Golovko N.V. What is not mentioned in the famous article by Edmund Gettier. Siberian Journal of Philosophy. 2023;21(1):105-126. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2023-21-1-105-126