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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">sibphil</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Сибирский философский журнал</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Siberian Journal of Philosophy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2541-7517</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Новосибирский государственный университет</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.25205/2541-7517-2024-22-2-46-65</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">sibphil-678</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СОЦИАЛЬНАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Почему оговорки достаточности недостаточно</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Why the sufficiency proviso is not enough</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3677-801X</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Морозов</surname><given-names>К. Е.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Morozov</surname><given-names>K. E.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Морозов Константин Евгеньевич - аспирант кафедры этики, младший научный сотрудник</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Konstantin E. Morozov - PhD student, Department of Ethics, Junior Research Fellow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">lovecraft.wittgenstein@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Московский государственный университет имени М. В. Ломоносова; Институт философии Российской академии наук</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Lomonosov Moscow State University; RAS Institute of Philosophy</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2024</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>12</day><month>03</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>22</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>46</fpage><lpage>65</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Морозов К.Е., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Морозов К.Е.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Morozov K.E.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/678">https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/678</self-uri><abstract><p>В последние годы среди теорий распределительной справедливости выделилось достаточностное или умеренное либертарианство Фабиана Вендта. Эта теория основана на аргументе от стремления к проектам и признаёт за людьми права самопринадлежности и собственности на внешние ресурсы. Но второе из этих прав ограничено оговоркой достаточности, которая требует, чтобы у всех людей была минимально достаточная доля ресурсов для участия в личных проектах. Эта статья критически рассматривает умеренное либертарианство, показывая, что его ограничение порогом достаточности несовместимо с его опорой на аргумент от стремления к проектам, поскольку последний имплицитно предполагает презумпцию равной заботы о людях. В отсутствие дополнительных оснований эта презумпция требует предоставления людям как исполнителям проектов не достаточной, а равной доли внешних ресурсов.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>In recent years, Fabian Wendt’s sufficientarian or moderate libertarianism has stood out among theories of distributive justice. This theory is based on the project pursuit argument and recognizes individual’s rights to self-ownership and ownership of external resources. But the second of these rights is limited by the sufficiency proviso, which requires that all people have a minimum sufficient share of resources to engage in personal projects. This article takes a critical look at moderate libertarianism, showing that its limitation to the sufficiency threshold is incompatible with its reliance on the project pursuit argument, since this argument implicitly assumes a presumption of equal concern for persons. In the absence of additional reasons, this presumption requires that people as projects pursuers be given not a sufficient, but an equal share of external resources.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>либертарианство</kwd><kwd>эгалитаризм</kwd><kwd>справедливость</kwd><kwd>автономия</kwd><kwd>равенство</kwd><kwd>взаимность</kwd><kwd>достаточность</kwd><kwd>самопринадлежность</kwd><kwd>оговорка Локка</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>libertarianism</kwd><kwd>egalitarianism</kwd><kwd>justice</kwd><kwd>autonomy</kwd><kwd>equality</kwd><kwd>reciprocity</kwd><kwd>sufficiency</kwd><kwd>self-ownership</kwd><kwd>Lockean proviso</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Дворкин Р. Либерализм // Современный либерализм / Сост. Л. Б. Макеева. М.: Дом интеллектуальной книги; Прогресс-Традиция, 1998. 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