sibphilСибирский философский журналSiberian Journal of Philosophy2541-7517Новосибирский государственный университет10.25205/2541-7517-2023-21-3-20-33sibphil-622Research ArticleАНАЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ, ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ И ФИЛОСОФИЯ НАУКИANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCEДизъюнктивизм и феноменология вниманияDisjunctivism and the phenomenology of attentionhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-2177-2638КоробковЛ. Г.KorobkovL. G.

Коробков Леонид Геннадьевич соискатель

Новосибирск

Leonid G. Korobkov postgraduate student

Novosibirsk

urlicht@zoho.comНовосибирский государственный университетРоссияNovosibirsk State UniversityRussian Federation2023220520242132033Copyright © Коробков Л.Г., 20242024Коробков Л.Г.Korobkov L.G.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/622

Дизъюнктивная теория Дж. Кэмпбелла имеет серьёзные недостатки, поскольку опирается на устаревшую модель, согласно которой восприятие в параллельном режиме обрабатывает элементарные признаки (цвет, ориентация, направление движения). В действительности, как показал Дж. Дункан [Duncan, 1984], наблюдатель более успешно различает два атрибута одного объекта, чем атрибуты разных объектов, что говорит о том, что уже на ранней стадии обработки данные восприятия кодируются как репрезентации целостных объектов. Дж. Кэмпбелл выводит определение внимания из определения сознания, и поэтому его подход неспособен объяснить то, как внимание оперирует бессознательными стимулами. В статье выражается скептическое отношение к отстаиваемому Дж. Кэмпбеллом «насыщенному представлению», согласно которому образ осознаваемой сцены включает детали, находящиеся вне фокуса внимания.

J. Campbell`s disjunctivist theory of perception is based on an outdated model of attention, which maintains that the focus of attention is analogous to the beam of a spotlight. Meanwhile, some studies challenge this view and suggests that attentional selection can be object-based. The narrow target of this article consists in clarifying what is at stake between attention-first and consciousness-first strategies. The latter assumes that one could explain what attention is by specifying how some proper subset of the conscious field comes to be foregrounded. Campbell who adopts it faces a serious challenge in explicating the phenomenon of unconscious attention.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.