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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">sibphil</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Сибирский философский журнал</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Siberian Journal of Philosophy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2541-7517</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Новосибирский государственный университет</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.25205/2541-7517-2022-20-2-43-56</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">sibphil-518</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>АНАЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ, ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ И ФИЛОСОФИЯ НАУКИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Аргумент к знанию: проблема определения и оценки</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Argument From Position to Know: The Problem of Identification and Evaluation</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4346-1117</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Карпов</surname><given-names>Г. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Karpov</surname><given-names>G. V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Карпов Глеб Викторович, кандидат философских наук, старший преподаватель</p><p>Санкт-Петербург</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Gleb V. Karpov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, senior lecturer</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">g.karpov@spbu.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Saint-Petersburg State University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>16</day><month>11</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>20</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>43</fpage><lpage>56</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Карпов Г.В., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Карпов Г.В.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Karpov G.V.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/518">https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/518</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье показывается, как, изменив привычные формулировки посылок и критических вопросов для презумптивных схем аргументации, можно оценивать аргумент еще до того, как стал известен его тип. На примере аргумента к знанию обосновывается возможность обнаружения видов классических презумптивных схем с учетом типа речевого акта, использовавшегося для их осуществления, и осведомленности говорящего и слушающего о пропозициональных установках друг друга. Виды аргумента к знанию предлагается различать по эпистемическому и иллокутивному основаниям. Одним из таких видов, вслед за Дж. Остином, можно считать перформативный аргумент к знанию. В статье описываются принципы его использования и намечается контур процедуры оценки.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article shows how, by changing the formulations of habitual premises and critical questions for pre­sumptive argumentation schemes, one can evaluate an argument even before its type has become known. The argument from position to know is used to justify the possibility of detecting types of classical pre­sumptive schemes when we take into account the type of speech act used to implement them, and the speaker and listener’s awareness of each other’s propositional attitudes. The types of argument from posi­tion to know are distinguished with respect to their epistemic and illocutionary variety. Following Austin one of these types can be considered a performative argument from position to know. The article describes the principles of its usage and outlines the evaluation procedure.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>схема аргументации</kwd><kwd>аргумент к знанию</kwd><kwd>оценка аргумента</kwd><kwd>критический вопрос</kwd><kwd>перформатив</kwd><kwd>речевой акт</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>argumentation scheme</kwd><kwd>argument from position to know</kwd><kwd>argument evaluation</kwd><kwd>critical question</kwd><kwd>performative</kwd><kwd>speech act</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group><funding-statement xml:lang="ru">Исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда (проект № 20-18-00158).</funding-statement><funding-statement xml:lang="en">The research was supported by RSF (Project № 20-18-00158).</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Остин Дж. Чужое сознание / Пер. М.А. 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