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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">sibphil</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Сибирский философский журнал</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Siberian Journal of Philosophy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2541-7517</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Новосибирский государственный университет</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.25205/2541-7517-2022-20-2-19-42</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">sibphil-517</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>АНАЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ, ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ И ФИЛОСОФИЯ НАУКИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Дж. Лэдимен, Д. Деннет и Дж. Лоу: Как существует электрон</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>J. Ladyman, D. Dennett and E.J. Lowe: How the electron exists</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4707-1231</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Головко</surname><given-names>Н. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Golovko</surname><given-names>N. V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Головко Никита Владимирович, доктор философских наук, доцент; аведующий кафедрой онтологии, теории познания и методологии науки; ведущий научный сотрудник</p><p>Новосибирск</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Nikita Golovko, Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy), Head of the Chair of Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology of Science</p><p>Novosibirsk</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">golovko@philosophy.nsc.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Новосибирский государственный университет; Институт философии и права СО РАН</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Novosibirsk State University; Institute of Philosophy and Law, SB RAS</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>15</day><month>11</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>20</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>19</fpage><lpage>42</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Головко Н.В., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Головко Н.В.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Golovko N.V.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/517">https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/517</self-uri><abstract><p>Цель работы – дать ответ на вопрос: «Как существует электрон?» с точки зрения общей логики дискурса философии науки, принимая во внимание современные философские концепции, объясняющие, что такое «электрон» и в каком смысле мы можем говорить о «существовании» таких объектов в первой четверти XXI века. Хорошая концепция существования объекта, постулируемого успешной научной теорией, как минимум должна учитывать два контекста собственно философских рассуждений – рассуждения «от науки», схватывающие вопросы философско-методологического обоснования знания на уровне определенных «стандартов рациональности», отвечающих выбранной теории, и рассуждения «от метафизики», которые в соответствующем контексте интерпретируют «электрон» как элемент объективной реальности так, как если бы электрон ученых существовал «на самом деле». Наш тезис заключается в том, что, выбрав в качестве основных элементов концепции деннетовский проект онтологии паттернов и неоаристотелевский проект категориальной онтологии Дж. Лоу, мы сможем блокировать проблему пессимистической метаиндукции (Х. Патнэм, Л. Лаудан и др.). Электрон существует как паттерн, который мы выделяем из всего набора эмпирических данных, ассоциируемых с теоретическим объектом «электрон», чье «реальное определение» сейчас задается Стандартной моделью и сопутствующими концепциями квантовой механики. В ходе научной революции электрон как паттерн никуда не исчезает, поскольку части «реальных определений» паттернов старой «парадигмы», тех, которые удастся ретроспективно проинтерпретировать и функционально значимо встроить в новую, будут включены в «реальные определения» новых паттернов, что указывает на наличие отношения «эссенциальной зависимости» между «старым» и «новым» паттернами.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The paper aims to answer the question: «How does an electron exist at the beginning of the 21st century?» from the point of view of the general logic of the philosophy of science discourse, taking into account con­temporary philosophical concepts that explain what an «electron» is, and in what sense we could talk about the «existence» of such objects in the first quarter of the 21st century. A good concept of the existence of an object postulated by a successful scientific theory should at least take into account two contexts of proper philosophical reasoning – reasoning «from science», grasping the questions of the philosophical and meth­odological justification of knowledge at the level of certain «standards of rationality» that correspond to the chosen theory, and reasoning «from metaphysics», which, in the appropriate context, interpret «elec­tron» as an element of objective reality, as if the electron of scientists «actually» existed. Our thesis is that by choosing as the main elements of the concept the Dennettian ontology of patterns project and the E.J. Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian categorical ontology project, we will be able to block the problem of pessimis­tic meta-induction (H. Putnam, L. Laudan, etc.). The electron exists as a pattern that we extract from the whole set of empirical data associated with the theoretical entity «electron», whose «real definition» right now is given by the Standard Model and the accompanying concepts from quantum mechanics. In the course of the scientific revolution, the electron, as a pattern, does not disappear anywhere, since parts of the «real definitions» of the patterns of the old «paradigm», those that can be retrospectively interpreted and functionally meaningfully coupled with the new one, will be asserted within the «real definitions» of the new patterns, which indicates on the existence of a relationship of «essential dependence» between the «old» and the «new» patterns.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>фундаментальная частица</kwd><kwd>пессимистическая мета-индукция</kwd><kwd>структурный реализм</kwd><kwd>паттерн</kwd><kwd>проецируемость</kwd><kwd>эссенциализм</kwd><kwd>сущность</kwd><kwd>реальное определение</kwd><kwd>субстанциальное изменение</kwd><kwd>контингентное знание</kwd><kwd>диалектический материализм</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>fundamental particle</kwd><kwd>pessimistic meta-induction</kwd><kwd>structural realism</kwd><kwd>pattern</kwd><kwd>projectability</kwd><kwd>essentialism</kwd><kwd>essence</kwd><kwd>real definition</kwd><kwd>substantial change</kwd><kwd>contingent knowledge</kwd><kwd>dialectical materialism</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Головко Н.В. 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