<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.3 20210610//EN" "JATS-journalpublishing1-3.dtd">
<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">sibphil</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Сибирский философский журнал</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Siberian Journal of Philosophy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2541-7517</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Новосибирский государственный университет</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.25205/2541-7517-2019-17-4-214-220</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">sibphil-329</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>НАУЧНАЯ ЖИЗНЬ, ПОЛЕМИКА И ДИСКУССИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>SCIENTIFIC LIFE, POLEMIC AND DISCUSSIONS</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Невоспринятие альтернативы и еще один аргумент в пользу инструментализма. Рец. на кн.: Stanford K. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press, 2006</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Unconceived Alternatives and Another Argument for Instrumentalism</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Головко</surname><given-names>Н. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Golovko</surname><given-names>N. V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">golovko@philosophy.nsc.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Институт философии и права СО РАН</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Institute of Philosophy and Law SB RAS</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2019</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>09</day><month>11</month><year>2020</year></pub-date><volume>17</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>214</fpage><lpage>220</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Головко Н.В., 2020</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2020</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Головко Н.В.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Golovko N.V.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/329">https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/329</self-uri><abstract><p>Селективный скептицизм в отношении фундаментальных научных теорий и критика вывода к лучшему объяснению, как элиминативного подхода к обоснованию гипотез, дают возможность К. Стэнфорду по-своему проинтерпретировать и объединить классические аргументы против научного реализма - аргументы пессимистической мета-индукции и недоопределенности теории данными. И, несмотря на тот факт, что обоснование инструменталистской трактовка научного знания - это еще одна версия аргумента «от ошибки», книга К. Стэнфорда должна быть рекомендована каждому, кто хочет понять, насколько разнообразной и глубокой может быть проблематика научного реализма. Размышления о книге: Stanford K. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press, 2006.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Selective skepticism in relation to fundamental scientific theories and criticism of the inference to the best explanation as an eliminative approach to substantiate hypotheses, enable K. Stanford to interpret and combine in his own way the classical arguments against the scientific realism - the arguments of the pessimistic meta-induction and that of the underdetermination of theory by data. Despite the fact that his justification of the instrumentalist interpretation of scientific knowledge is just another version of the argument «from error», K. Stanford’s book should be recommended to anyone who wants to understand how diverse and deep the problems of scientific realism could be. Reflection on the book: Stanford K. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press, 2006.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>невоспринятые альтернативы</kwd><kwd>инструментализм</kwd><kwd>селективный скептицизм</kwd><kwd>новая индукция</kwd><kwd>научный реализм</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>K. Стэнфорд</kwd><kwd>K. Stanford</kwd><kwd>unconceived alternatives</kwd><kwd>instrumentalism</kwd><kwd>selective skepticism</kwd><kwd>scientific realism</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title></ref-list><fn-group><fn fn-type="conflict"><p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article>
