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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">sibphil</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Сибирский философский журнал</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Siberian Journal of Philosophy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2541-7517</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Новосибирский государственный университет</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.25205/2541-7517-2018-16-3-81-88</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">sibphil-129</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СОЦИАЛЬНАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ОГРАНИЧЕНИЯ ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОГО ПОДХОДА К ЭЛИТОГЕНЕЗУ</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>INSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC APPROACH TO THE GENESIS OF ELITES</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Обухов</surname><given-names>А. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Obukhov</surname><given-names>A. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">a.obukhov@nsu.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Новосибирский государственный университет</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Novosibirsk State University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2018</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>26</day><month>10</month><year>2020</year></pub-date><volume>16</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>81</fpage><lpage>88</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Обухов А.А., 2020</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2020</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Обухов А.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Obukhov A.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/129">https://sibphil.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/129</self-uri><abstract><p>Традиционной проблемой демократического устройства общества является несоответствие между утопической концепцией общенародного выбора наиболее достойных членов во властные структуры и реальным положением вещей, когда представители правящих элит используют власть в личных целях, игнорируя потребности общества, и искажают выборный процесс, применяя манипулятивные технологии (Дж. Робинсон, Г. Алмонд и др.). Цель работы - содержательно объяснить причины отклоняющегося (оппортунистического) поведения представителей правящих элит при принятии социально значимых решений, используя модель рынков с асимметричной информацией Дж. Акерлоффа. При неравном доступе к информационным потокам, «плохие» кандидаты на выборные должности вытесняют «хороших» в соответствии с принципами «негативного отбора». Непреодолимый характер описанных ограничений демократического подхода к элитогенезу свидетельствует о наличии фундаментальных ограничений применимости демократического способа формирования правящих элит, а также необходимости поиска альтернативных способов формирования властных структур.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The common problem of the democratic society is the discrepancy between the utopian idea of the nationwide choice of the worthiest members to serve in the governmental bodies and the real state of affairs when representatives of the ruling elites use their power for personal purposes, ignoring the needs of society, and distorting the electoral process using manipulative technologies (J. Robinson, G. Almond and others). The paper aims to explain the reasons for such a deviant (opportunistic) behavior of the ruling elite representatives in a meaningful way when making socially significant decisions, using the markets with asymmetric information model by George Akerlof. With unequal access to information flows, «inappropriate» candidates for elective positions displace «good» candidates in accordance with the principle of «negative selection». The compelling nature of these limitations to the democratic approach for elites origin signifies the existence of fundamental restrictions of the applicability of democracy, as well as the need to look for the alternative ways to form the governmental bodies.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>демократия</kwd><kwd>элитогенез</kwd><kwd>асимметрия информации</kwd><kwd>проблема негативного отбора</kwd><kwd>Дж. Акерлофф</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>democracy</kwd><kwd>elites origin</kwd><kwd>information asymmetry</kwd><kwd>negative selection</kwd><kwd>G. Akerlof</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Алексеев П. В. Социальная философия. М.: Проспект, 2017.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Алексеев П. В. Социальная философия. М.: Проспект, 2017.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Крыштановская О. В. Анатомия российской элиты. М.: Захаров, 2005.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Крыштановская О. В. Анатомия российской элиты. М.: Захаров, 2005.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit3"><label>3</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Розов Н. С. 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